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Improving Incentive Pay Plans 
for Buyers 
by KENNARD W . WEBSTER 
Partner, New York Office 
Presented before the 44th National Convention of 
the Controllers' Congress, National Retail Mer-
chants Association, Hollywood, Florida—May 1964 
IN 1957 your organization published a report on "Salary and Bonus Pay-
ment Plans for Buyers . . .". At that time it was found that around 90 
per cent of department and large specialty stores pay buyers with some 
sort of salary-plus-bonus arrangement. Finding an incentive pay plan of 
compensation for buyers that is fair to store and buyer alike is a continuing 
problem. It will always remain a problem, to some extent, since formulas, 
no matter how clever or how devious, have ways of "not exactly fitting 
the situation this year"; or they depend on data, such as share of market 
or trend of local economic conditions, that are difficult to develop. 
We always hope to improve a little, over the years, and improving in-
centive pay plans is no exception. But we'll probably never reach perfection 
or approach Utopia because of the many variables met with in evaluating a 
buyer's performance. Sometimes I think a sound-thinking merchandise 
manager who has watched a department's operations for the year, armed 
with a check list to be sure he has covered the main points, can reach an 
empirical judgment in the matter of incentive bonus that is as good as any 
formula. It may be better, as far as paying the buyer what he's worth is 
concerned, based on performance. But a review of performance, however 
sound, made after the fact without the bench marks laid down for the 
buyer a year ahead of time, won't achieve the maximum incentive. 
POINTS TO CONSIDER 
So we come to a point to be stressed in improving incentive plans: To 
provide the most incentive throughout the year, inform the buyer what is 
expected and how his incentive pay will be calculated, so he can work 
toward as big an incentive payment as possible. 
This point rather presupposes that the whole incentive plan is figured 
out in advance. In that survey of salary and bonus-payment plans for buyers 
made in 1957, 64 per cent of stores used salary plus year-end bonus with a 
definite arrangement between the store and the buyer, 28 per cent had no 
oral or written argeement and 8 per cent paid straight salary only. 
Of the stores with a definite bonus arrangement with buyers, about 75 
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per cent have set up one or more specific requirements to be met before any 
bonus is considered to be earned at all. I quote from the 1957 report: 
The requirement most often taken into consideration by the stores in 
determining whether or not a bonus will be paid in the order of the 
frequency in which they were mentioned, are: 
• a sales quota to be reached or exceeded 
• a sales increase to be made 
• a fixed gross margin percentage to be maintained 
• a certain net profit to be made 
• a fixed gross profit to be made 
• satisfactory inventory condition and shrinkage 
• a certain turnover rate maintained 
• the standard markup maintained 
• adequate discounts received 
• service with the store of at least a minimum length of time 
• a certain contribution of the department to the store. 
Some stores require only one such factor, but the majority com-
bine two or three in the arrangement. Sales quota or sales increase 
are contained in the "requirement clause" of nearly all the stores hav-
ing a definite agreement plan. Usually there are gross margin per-
centages or profit requirements that must be reached in the department 
before the buyer is eligible for a bonus on the sales excess over quota. 
Bonuses based on sales are the most common, of course. This approach, 
unless coupled with a penalty for not maintaining an adequqate gross 
margin, can cause the buyer to sacrifice profit for sales volume. Since gross 
margin dollars are more useful than sales dollars, this is an important point 
to include along with sales. Another problem with using sales, or any like 
factor dealing with volumes, is that a buyer can earn or not earn a bonus 
because of factors outside his control. 
This can work out unfairly to either the buyer or the management. 
For example, New York City stores will undoubtedly have a better than 
average selling summer owing to the World's Fair. This will increase many 
buyer's bonuses, resulting from outside environment. Contrari-wise, a city 
suffering a prolonged strike in a major industry, just before Christmas, 
could reduce sales significantly and reduce a buyer's bonus. If the buyer is 
on his toes in such a situation, and stays on top of his open-to-buy, cancels 
orders, and generally stays up nights to do a good job in a difficult cir-
cumstance, he may actually be deserving of a better bonus than usual, rather 
than ending up with a cut in pay. 
This thought brings up another important point in improving in-
centive plans: No mathematical formula is a substitute for sound judgment. 
No formula can consider all eventualities. Plans should permit departures 
from formulas, if appropriate in the circumstances. 
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This situation suggests that there are at least three factors to any 
incentive pay plan: 
• A base salary from which to start 
• A mathematical formula, expressing the intent of the incentive 
• A discretionary increment or reduction to cover unusual events. 
As an approach, the paying of incentives based on maintaining gross 
margin percentages, or a fixed amount of gross profit, has some advantages 
over the use of pure sales volume or quotas. It does take into consideration 
that profits are as important, are really more important, than volume alone. 
We are, after all, in business to make money. It works well in more cases, 
with one major exception: If the criterion is a percentage of gross margin 
rather than the most dollars of gross margin, the buyer can keep prices and 
mark-ons up at the expense of volume and make less gross-profit dollars in 
the long run. The thing to shoot for, of course, is the right profit/volume 
relationship. $100,000 at 40 per cent is $40,000 in gross margin. $110,000 
at 37 per cent is $40,700 in gross margin. A plan should take this into con-
sideration. 
If we move from a criterion of gross profit to net profit, then we hold 
the buyer responsible for another batch of factors—the operating expenses. 
This net-profit approach was the fourth most popular bonus factor in the 
1957 N R D G A survey. As an aside, although the 1957 report is seven 
years old, a similar report, made in 1947, ten years previous—showed little 
difference in results. So if the change in the last seven years is similar to 
that of the previous ten, their data should still be representative. A new 
report is planned, I understand, within the next few months. 
But come back to net profits. The interjection of the effect of operating 
expenses on volume and gross profits is a more inclusive measure of a 
buyer's performance than just volume or gross profit. It tells him that to 
earn a bonus he has to watch his expenses too. If he wastes advertising, or 
permits too large a sales staff, then at least some of this error in judgment 
will hit him where it hurts the most—in his pocketbook. So long as the 
buyer has enough control over expenses to have a reasonable control over 
net profit as well, then operating profit can be a fair and sound approach 
to paying an incentive bonus. But these operating expenses, subtracted from 
gross to arrive at net, bear a little analysis from the standpoint of who is 
responsible for what. 
When a department is allocated expenses that the buyer cannot him-
self control, such as cost of space, credit department or accounting de-
partment overhead, and these expenses are in turn subtracted from gross 
margin to produce net profit, then fluctuations in these allocated expenses 
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can and will affect the buyer's bonus if the bonus calculation is based on 
net. This can be unfair to the buyer or the management. If these expenses 
increase, the buyer is perturbed; if they decrease, he gets something for 
nothing. If he can control expenses, fine. Then include them in a bonus 
calculation. If he cannot, it's probably fairest to leave them out. The point 
brings up another principle of incentive calculations: Include only those 
items which the buyer can control, in developing incentive formulas. 
By way of illustration, Exhibit A attached shows a sample depart-
mental operating statement using the "Controllable Profit Contribution" 
concept. 
The "Controllable Profit Contribution" concept takes us a long way 
toward finding a good base for incentive bonuses. It takes into considera-
tion sales volume, maintenance of margins, and expense control, where 
the buyer can in fact exercise it. It doesn't completely close the circle, but 
it's a good start. The information is also readily available. 
There are other factors worth considering. A quick list of other factors 
might be: 
• Inventory condition and shrinkage 
• Inventory turn 
• Employee turnover within the department 
• Penalties for poor performance in particular areas 
• Share of market 
• Economic trends 
• Performance ratings on duties and responsibilities, and the whole 
subject of establishing the base salary itself. 
Of the list above, the one receiving the most attention is usually the 
area of inventories. In calculating gross profits for bonus purposes some 
stores include a penalty for old merchandise. A typical penalty might be: 
Inventories over two seasons at inventory time shall be included at 50 per 
cent of the then marked retail price. Some plans provide for a penalty if 
stock losses exceed an established standard figure. Likewise, some plans 
provide penalties if inventories do not reach a budgeted turn. The purpose 
of all this, of course, is to encourage the buyer to maintain fresh stock 
under good control. The penalty for stock losses may be going a little too 
far. 
EVALUATING A BUYER 
Employee turnover can be important in evaluating a buyer. It can also 
be misinterpreted. Some buyers are hard to work for and clerks quit be-
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cause of it. Sometimes turnover is high because of storewide policies the 
buyer cannot control. Occasionally, the turnover is too low because the job 
is too easy for the pay. One approach that on an occasional basis appears to 
me to be useful is to have the department shopped from the standpoint of 
department morale and training—shopped from the standpoint of evaluating 
the effectiveness of the salesclerks, their knowledge of their products, their 
friendliness, their helpfulness, and the speed with which they carry out a 
transaction. Shopping reports should go back to the buyer so that he can 
correct things that may be going wrong. 
Probably one of the most difficult and one of the most useful evalua-
tions for a buyer has to do with the problems of his particular department 
in relation to similar departments in competitive stores in that area. The 
most useful indication in this regard is a figure indicating his share of mar-
ket and whether he is gaining or losing his share compared to the immediate 
competition. But the data for share of market is hard to come by. Another 
difficult problem is to separate increases and decreases in business due to 
the efforts of the buyer as compared to the effect of the store itself or to the 
economic climate. Sales can be compared to local economic curves and the 
effect of the movement of the economy can be factored out of the sales/ 
volume picture. Likewise, if the total store is gaining or losing its share of 
the market, this gain or loss can be factored out of the department figures 
so as to come down to a raw sales increase or decrease most closely ap-
proximating the performance of the buyer himself. Again, this isn't easy to 
do. Even if it can be done, the problem of explaining the validity of the 
statistical computations to the satisfaction of the buyer remain. If you can 
do these things, it's worth the effort. If you can't do them well, it's probably 
better not to let them affect incentive compensations. 
BASE SALARY 
One more point: The function of the base salary, in my opinion, is to 
represent a guaranteed predetermined salary for doing an average job. A 
bonus for incentive should be reserved for the buyer who does an above-
average job. The incentive bonus is something extra because the buyer gave 
something extra. 
The base salary should be in line with area wages for the degree of 
experience and age of the buyer. It should take into consideration his length 
of service. It should be increased as the buyer improves, based on an over-
all evaluation of how the buyer carries out his responsibilities and authori-
ties, but should not be increased beyond the worth of the position itself. 
In evaluating base salaries, a rating sheet summarizing the buyer's 
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responsibilities is a useful tool. A sheet listing typical responsibilities of 
the buyer is attached as Exhibit B. If each item on this list is carefully rated 
as to average, above average, or below average, this should represent a 
good profile for establishing base pay. 
CONCLUSION 
Probably the best incentive is that if a man does a good job he gets to 
keep it. The purpose of base pay is to provide a competitive salary for an 
average job. It is a cleaner policy if base pay and incentives are not mixed. 
EXHIBIT A 
S A M P L E D E P A R T M E N T A L OPERATING S T A T E M E N T 
(Illustrating "Controllable Profit Contribution" Concept) 
Better 
or 
Budget Actual (Worse) 
N E T SALES $ $ $ 
GROSS MARGIN A N D CASH DISCOUNTS $ $ $ 
C O N T R O L L A B L E E X P E N S E S : 
Salaries—Buyers and assistants 
Salaries—Clerical and stock 
Selling payroll 
Direct advertising charges 
Travel 
Communications and delivery expenses 
T O T A L C O N T R O L L A B L E EXPENSES $ $ $ 
C O N T R O L L A B L E PROFIT CONTRIBUTION $ $ $ 
(Note—Salaries include Fringe Benefits at ¢ per dollar of payroll) 
INCENTIVE PAT PLANS FOR BUYERS 325 
EXHIBIT B 
FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BUYER 
These duties are arranged in order of importance to stores doing an annual volume 
of over 10 million dollars. Percentages of stores requiring the buyer to perform each 
listed function are shown by volume groups. 
Function 
Develop merchandise plan 
Select and buy merchandise 
Set price of merchandise 
Plan promotions for department 
Check department's merchandise assortments 
Provide merchandise training for salespeople 
Plan advertising for department 
Supervise stock keeping 
Supervise interior display 
Assign duties to salespeople 
Plan department's window display 
Assist salespeople in closing sales 
Supervise reserve stock room 
Provide salesmanship training 
Supervise merchandise control 
Supervise informative labeling of 
department's merchandise 
Supervise receiving of department 
merchandise 
Supervise marking of merchandise 
Make own sales on floor 
* An excerpt from the report "Salary and Bonus Payment Plans for Buyers and 
Divisional Merchandise Managers", published in 1957 by The Merchandising Division, 
National Retail Dry Goods Association. 
Over 10 5-10 1-5 Under 1 
million million million million 
100% 100% 90% 57% 
100 100 100 100 
100 100 98 100 
100 100 98 100 
100 95 98 100 
100 100 77 57 
95 90 82 71 
94 95 93 100 
90 85 77 57 
85 95 99 100 
80 85 65 57 
80 90 89 100 
76 90 89 100 
66 98 57 57 
67 90 68 85 
57 90 82 57 
42 50 46 71 
38 65 51 71 
38 70 75 100 
